Regional trade agreements (RTAs) and currency unions (CUs) share the characteristic of being potentially endogenous proxies for trade costs in gravity equations. In both cases, this problem is magni…ed by the paucity of reliable instruments. Instead of resorting to the oft-employed alternative of panel data to address selection on just the time-invariant unobservables, this paper assesses the extent to which the positive association between CU or RTA membership and bilateral trade can be considered causal. Despite not identifying point estimates, striking results are obtained when looking at overall trade and extensive margins. Although most cross-sections exhibit a positive association between both RTAs and CUs and overall bilateral trade, the evidence in favor of a causal e¤ect is strong only for CUs. Interestingly, for recent years, there exists strong evidence in support of both RTAs and CUs causing trade at the extensive margin. However, the magnitude of either e¤ect is sensitive to the amount of selection on unobservables.
Introduction
Although Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, p. 710) allude to a "list of observable arguments ... which have been used in the trade cost function"of gravity equations, analyses pertaining to the e¤ects of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and currency unions (CUs) have perhaps received the most attention. 1 regard studies pertaining to the "economic e¤ects" of CUs as "imperative."
Apart from being relevant from a trade policy perspective, RTAs and CUs also share the common characteristic of being potentially endogenous regressors in a gravity equation. In fact, while discussing trade cost proxies which may not be exogenous, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, p. 706) provide "membership in a currency union or regional trade agreement" as examples. In other words, the point estimates of RTA and CU coe¢ cients are clearly susceptible to bias from selection on unobservables. To make matters worse, the sign of the bias is also ambiguous, as discussed by Barro and Tenreyro (2007) in the context of CUs, and Baier and Bergstrand (2009a) with respect to trade agreements. Although instrumental variables (IV) could be used in theory to estimate the causal e¤ects of RTAs or CUs, the selection issue is further plagued by the lack of appropriate instruments for both. While Frankel and Rose (2002, p. 459) suggest that "plausible instrumental variables for currency union membership do not appear to exist in practice," Bergstrand (2007, 2009a ) also rue the lack of reliable instruments in the context of trade agreements. As a result, point estimates from gravity equations seem all the more questionable. Incidentally, both Rose (2000, p. 17) and Frankel and Rose (2002, p. 461 ) recommend against taking the point estimates of the CU e¤ect "too literally." In the context of trade agreements, Ghosh and Yamarik (2004, p. 389 ) take an even stronger stand by referring to a point estimate as a "quantitative magnitude for ignorance."
In light of this, the current study contributes to the literature by acknowledging the unreliability of point estimates, and instead assessing the sensitivity of RTA and CU coe¢ cient estimates, obtained under exogeneity, to non-random selection. While most authors in the literature have resorted to panel data in order to control for selection on just the time-invariant unobservables, the approach in this paper is novel. 2 Given recent concerns over the evolution of trade at two margins, i.e., intensive and extensive, the selection issue is also examined at the latter. In addition, this paper also provides the …rst study to examine, in relative detail, the combined e¤ect of RTAs and CUs by considering country pairs party to both as the treatment group. Intriguingly, Baur and Winschel (2009) is the only study, to the author's knowledge, to consider a combined e¤ect of CU and free trade agreement membership. Using a Bayes network approach, Baur and Winschel (2009) conclude that the e¤ect of any joint policy should be examined by modeling the policy combination as a separate regime. In other words, the combined policy e¤ect should not be deduced as the sum of the individual policies'partial e¤ects.
Using theoretically consistent gravity models and data that include country pairs with zero trade, striking results are obtained. Although most cross-sections …nd both RTAs and CUs to be associated with increased overall bilateral trade, the evidence in favor of a causal e¤ect is strong only for CUs. On the contrary, most positive and signi…cant RTA coe¢ cients, estimated under the assumption of exogeneity, can be explained by even modest levels of positive selection under a set of reasonable assumptions. Accordingly, concerns over selection bias are well-founded in the context of trade agreements. In case of CUs, Rose's (2001, p. 456) conjecture that "non-random selection"is of "academic interest, but unimportant in practice," appears di¢ cult to deny by analyzing overall trade. Interestingly, for recent years, there exists substantial evidence in favor of both RTAs and CUs having some sort of a robust causal e¤ect on trade at the extensive margin. However, the magnitude of either e¤ect is sensitive to the amount of selection on unobservables. Moreover, results from the paper suggest that in order to determine the trade-inducing e¤ect of membership into both CUs and RTAs, the policy combination should be modeled as a separate regime.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 presents the results, while Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review Regional Trade Agreements
Before proceeding to review even part of the existing gravity literature on the e¤ects of trade agreements, it is important to recognize the types of such agreements. While a preferential trade agreement is essentially an arrangement among countries whereby members engage in trade at reduced tari¤ rates, they can be classi…ed as partial or total with respect to the extent of duty reduction or commodity coverage. In fact, the total agreements can be further categorized on the basis of their level of integration. 3 uses a simultaneous equations model in providing "one of the …rst estimates" of the e¤ect of preferential trade agreements while attempting to address the issue of endogeneity. Although Magee (2003) relies on IV and …nds countries'volume of bilateral trade to increase the possibility of their entering into a trade 3 In this context, it should be noted that Frankel (1997) also categorizes partial agreements as reciprocal and nonreciprocal.
Frankel (1997, p. 13) considers one-way concessions to have been "widely tolerated" by the General Agreement on Tari¤s and   Trade (GATT). agreement, the evidence on the impact of such agreements on trade is less clear. Moreover, the quality of instruments used, such as GDP similarities between two countries, or di¤erences in their relative factor endowments, is clearly suspect. Interestingly, despite being questionable, the instruments in Magee (2003) can still be credited for highlighting the fact that most political and economic variables fail to satisfy the required exclusion restriction, and hence, should not be used as instruments.
Given the issue of non-random selection and the paucity of reliable instruments, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) recommend the use of panel data in order to at least control for selection on the basis of timeinvariant unobservables. Accordingly, Kandogan (2008) and Magee (2008) , among others, have resorted to the use of panel …xed e¤ects. However, such results should also be interpreted with caution given the tension between the time dimension of the data and the assumption of time-invariant unobservables.
Moreover, even the use of panel data does not quell the ambiguity regarding the direction of bias. While tion on observables by alluding to "many" who "have argued that the selection bias on observables may well dominate that on unobservables." However, the fact that the gravity model does not specify which observables to include in the trade cost function is well-known. In such a scenario, this study contributes to the literature by controlling for a fairly representative set of observables, and then assessing the robustness of RTA coe¢ cient estimates to selection on unobservables.
Currency Unions
Unlike the case of trade agreements, the literature analyzing the e¤ects of CUs on members' trade is relatively recent and can be traced only as far back as Rose (2000) . Since
Rose's (2000) analysis found CUs to more than triple bilateral trade, according to Rose and Stanley (2005, p. 348), "nearly everyone" considered the e¤ect to be "implausibly large." In fact, Rose and Stanley (2005, p. 348) go on to hold the magnitude of the point estimate responsible for having motivated nearly "all the subsequent research in this area." Interestingly, the subsequent studies have mostly con…rmed a substantial CU e¤ect. In other words, the positive and sizeable CU e¤ect has proven to be robust to the use of matching techniques in studies such as Rose (2001) , panel …xed e¤ects as in Glick and Rose (2002) , and IV as in Rose (2000) . 4 Using pre-World War I data, Flandreau and Maurel (2001) 5 According to Barro and Tenreyro (2007) , two countries may share a common currency due to their independent decisions to maintain parity with a third anchor currency. As a result, the instrument for the CU dummy is obtained as the joint probability that a country pair adopts the same anchor currency. However, unobservable historical and political ties between two countries may not only a¤ect their bilateral trade, but may also lead to their choice of a common anchor thereby rendering the validity of the instrument doubtful. In addition, the lack of theoretically motivated multilateral resistance terms make the results unreliable. 6 Chintrakarn (2008) provides a concise review of this literature.
this by stating that "the central tendencies" of the euro estimates "seems to be an e¤ect in the …rst few years on the order of 10-15%." The meta-analysis in Havránek (2009, p. 7) lends further support to this by …nding the e¤ects of the euro and other CUs to be "immensely di¤erent."Accordingly, for the relevant cross-section, the CU e¤ect is analyzed in this study with and without the euro countries as part of the treatment group.
Although the euro's role in encouraging bilateral trade is examined, the focus is essentially on assessing the extent to which CUs and RTAs cause trade, if any. This paper also contributes to the literature by providing the …rst study, to the author's knowledge, to examine the combined e¤ect of CU and RTA membership in relative detail.
3 Empirical Methodology
Baseline Approach
In keeping with most of the empirical literature on RTAs and CUs, gravity models are estimated in logs. 7 problem, convergence of the bivariate probits with country …xed e¤ects proved very di¢ cult for majority of the cross-sections. For completeness, the log speci…cation is subjected to both methods.
Log Model Using Country Fixed E¤ects
The (cross-section) speci…cation is given by 7 Note that Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) caution against the log model because heteroskedasticity in levels can induce correlation between the covariates and the error term in logs even if the covariates are exogenous in the levels model. Since the objective here is to assess sensitivity to correlation between covariates and the error term in the log model, this issue is not particularly relevant. In addition, estimation in logs enables comparison to the literature. 8 In Baier and Bergstrand (2009b) , the Taylor expansion is centred around a world of symmetric trade costs, i.e., tij = t for all country pairs ij. Here t denotes trade costs.
Here, T ij is the value of imports of country i from country j; D ij is a dummy variable taking the value one if i and j belong to the same RTA, or CU, or both, depending on the treatment under consideration, and zero otherwise; and X ij is a vector of observable attributes of country-pair ij (including an intercept).
The following covariates are included in X: (log) distance between i and j, (log) sum of geographical areas of i and j, a binary variable assuming the value unity if i and j share a land border, a dummy variable taking the value one if i and j share a common language, a dummy variable taking the value one if i and j share a common religion, a binary variable taking the value unity if i has ever been a colony of j, a binary variable taking the value unity if i has ever been a colonizer of j, a dummy variable taking the value one if i is considered to be a colony of j, a dummy variable taking the value one if i is considered to be a colonizer of j, a binary variable assuming the value unity if i and j were ever colonized by the same colonizer, a measure of the intensity of military con ‡ict between i and j, a dummy variable taking the value one if i and j are in a formal alliance, a dummy variable taking the value one if both i and j are WTO members, a dummy variable taking the value one if either i or j is a WTO member, a dummy variable taking the value 1 if i o¤ers preferences to j under the Generalized System of Preferences, and a dummy variable taking the value 1 if j o¤ers preferences to i under the Generalized System of Preferences. 9
i and j are country-speci…c dummies. 10 The pairwise unobservables are denoted by " ij and capture all remaining factors a¤ecting bilateral trade.
Log Model Using BVOLS
In this case, the (cross-section) speci…cation is given by
Due to the use of BVOLS instead of country-speci…c dummies, the variables ln GDP i and ln GDP j appear in (2). Here, GDP i (GDP j ) is the real gross domestic product (GDP) of country i (j). 11
Before proceeding, it is important to note that all variables in (2) except the GDPs depict trade costs.
As a result, all such variables enter the MR terms. However, for brevity, the MR term from Baier and
Bergstrand's (2009b) BVOLS method is only de…ned for a representative trade cost variable, t ij , faced by country pair ij. In other words, each trade cost variable (t ij ) in (2) has a corresponding MR term, given by 9 Here, area of a country is also considered to re ‡ect trade costs. In fact, Melitz (2008, p. 676) considers area to be "a proxy for internal distance." 1 0 The country dummies are usually used to control for country-speci…c unobservables that do not vary across trading partners as well as the MR terms. In this case, they also capture the impact of GDP. 1 1 The US consumer price index is used to express GDP in 1995 dollars.
where N is the number of countries, and k ( m ) is the GDP share of country k (m). Also, the theory in Baier and Bergstrand (2009b) restricts the coe¢ cients on each t ij and the corresponding MRt ij to be identical but of opposite signs. Henceforth, these restrictions are referred to as BV constraints. The BV constraints imply that = e and = e . Note that with the BV constraints, the trade cost variables can be conceptualized as t ij MRt ij .
Sensitivity to Selection on Unobservables
In light of the endogeneity issues exacerbated by the lack of suitable instruments, two methodologies for assessing the extent of selection bias are discussed. assessing the extent of selection on unobservables by using "the degree of selection on observables as a guide." In order to employ it in this context, the set of non-treatment covariates needs to be conceived of as a random draw from the (large) set of all factors a¤ecting bilateral trade with no factor (observed or unobserved) having an overriding in ‡uence. 12 In such a scenario, the extent of selection on unobservables is expected to equal the amount of selection on observables. As a result, the robustness of the causal e¤ect, obtained under exogeneity, can be determined by asking how the amount of selection on unobservables must compare to the amount of selection on observables to fully explain the estimated e¤ect. Intuitively, a large value (i.e., greater than one) of the estimated factor or ratio, suggests robustness of the obtained treatment e¤ect to selection on unobservables. Contrarily, a small value (i.e., at least less than one) of the ratio indicates susceptibility to selection bias. of gravity models as documented in Henderson and Millimet (2008) , one might think that the assumptions of equal amounts of selection on observables and unobservables is unrealistic in this application. Thus, one might interpret a value of anything above, say, 0.75 as indicative of a robust causal e¤ect. Nonetheless, the author sticks to a value of one to be conservative and errs on the side of rejecting the null of a causal e¤ect of the treatment. However, the reader should be cautious in interpreting ratios below one, but still fairly sizeable.
Extent of Selection on Unobservables
Before proceeding, it is essential to note that the main objective of this study is to assess the extent to which any (estimated) positive and signi…cant association between bilateral trade and membership into RTAs, or CUs, or both, can be considered causal. As a result, unlike studies which aim at point identi…cation, absence of a positive association, under exogeneity, does not merit attention. In other words, if the estimated treatment e¤ect is insigni…cant, or even negative, then the issue of sensitivity to positive selection is moot (unless one believes in the possibility that the policy variables under consideration might actually have a negative, causal e¤ect on bilateral trade).
To proceed, the (normalized) amount of selection on unobservables is represented as
where D denotes the treatment under consideration and " depicts the unobservables in (1) and (2). Similarly, the amount of selection on observables, adjusted for variance, is formalized by
where Z refers to the set of non-treatment regressors in the (outcome) equations, (1) and (2), and is the corresponding coe¢ cient vector. 13 Under the assumption that the amount of selection on unobservables is equal to the amount of selection on observables, the ratios in (4) and (5) are expected to be equal.
Next, in the wake of evidence suggesting a trade promoting e¤ect of any of the treatments, the idea is to quantify the amount of selection on unobservables, relative to the amount of selection on observables, that would be necessary to attribute the entire e¤ect to selection bias. In order to compute this implied ratio, …rst express treatment participation as
Substituting (6) into (1) or (2) results in
Now, the probability limit of the OLS estimate of can be decomposed into the true treatment e¤ect and bias as
Given the assumptions invoked above, the amount of selection on unobservables is expected to be equal to the extent of selection on observables. Accordingly, the bias term in (8) is expressed as
From (9), computation of the bias term requires identi…cation of . However, under the null of no treatment e¤ect, can be estimated from (7) Finally, the implied ratio is computed by dividing the estimate of , obtained under exogeneity, by the bias calculated from (9).
Since the MR terms are controlled for by using country …xed e¤ects or the BVOLS terms, both approaches are employed while assessing the robustness of treatment e¤ects. In fact, although the BVOLS approach is not needed in the log models, results from both approaches are presented nonetheless to convince the reader that each is valid. This is useful since later, in the bivariate probit model, we rely exclusively on the BVOLS approach. In this context, it should be noted that although the Taylor expansion in Baier and Bergstrand (2009b) recommends imposition of the BV constraints, the BVOLS method is also employed without the constraints imposed. Also, since the bias term in (9) is computed under the null of no treatment e¤ect, the MR term for the treatment variable, MRD, is not included as a regressor in (6) or (7) when is constrained to be zero.
Bivariate Probit Model
Given recent concerns over the evolution of trade at the intensive and extensive margins, the selection issue is also analyzed at the extensive margin of trade by conducting a bivariate probit analysis along the lines of Altonji et al. (2005) . To the author's knowledge, Egger et al. 
where T ij is a binary variable assuming the value unity in case of positive bilateral trade between i and j, I( ) is the indicator function, D ij continues to represent the treatment under consideration, and "; N 2 (0; 0; 1; 1; ). The correlation between unobservables determining a country-pair's decision to engage in bilateral trade and unobservables that a¤ect their likelihood of entering into a trade agreement, or currency union, or both, is denoted by . As a result, while > 0 denotes positive selection on unobservables, negative selection is depicted by < 0. In this context, it is important to note that Z ij includes the set of all regressors in (2), except D ij , since the MR terms are controlled for by adopting the BVOLS approach. Also, estimation is performed with and without the imposition of the BV constraints in the outcome equation. 14 Now, the lack of reliable instruments in the context of the log model also raises concerns over the availability of suitable exclusion restrictions here. While the model can still be identi…ed o¤ the assumption of bivariate normality, results obtained solely from such parametric assumptions are not viewed as reliable.
Again, since the ultimate focus lies in assessing the robustness of any apparent trade promoting e¤ect obtained under exogeneity, an alternative methodology is adopted. First, the parametric restriction is made less severe by constraining and estimating the conditional likelihood function (i.e., the model conditional on the constrained value of ). Next, sensitivity to increasing amounts of positive selection is gauged by constraining to 0, 0.1, ..., 0.5. In addition, the unconstrained model is also estimated, relying solely on the parametric assumption, to provide some indication of the likely value of .
Data
The majority of the data come from Liu (2009); thus, only limited details are provided. 15 The 2003 CIA Fact Book is relied on for data on the other trade cost variables including latitudes and longitudes for constructing great-circle distances.
Even a cursory glance at the summary statistics presented in Table 1 suggests selection (on observables)
into RTAs and CUs. For example, country pairs which are RTA (CU) members not only seem to engage in more bilateral trade than non-RTA (non-CU) countries, but are also more likely to be characterized by proximity and adjacency. As a result, the summary statistics provide further motivation for examining the selection issue. Tables 2, 3 , and 4 utilize cross-section data for the years 1950, 1960, ..., 2000, in providing coe¢ cient estimates from the log model. The results in Table 2 correspond to the case where the treatment dummy, D, in Section 3 is de…ned as one if countries i and j share a RTA. Similarly, the results in Table 3 correspond to CU as the treatment. For results pertaining to Table 4 , the treatment variable, D, assumes the value one if i and j share a CU and RTA. Apart from considering country pairs belonging to both CUs and RTAs as the treatment group, Table 4 also di¤ers from Tables 2 and 3 by providing estimates from only 1960 onwards. This is necessitated by the presence of extremely few country pairs belonging to both CUs and RTAs during 1950. Tables 3 and 4 also distinguish themselves from Table 2 by providing two sets of estimates for 2000 -with and without the euro countries as members of a CU. Given the infancy of euro, and the fact that the euro countries di¤er from members of other CUs in terms of economic size, 1 8 The author would like to thank Xuepeng Liu and Andrew Rose for their help in this. 1 9 A few minor corrections, were also made to the WTO membership variables. As a result of the corrections, Czechoslovakia this is relevant. 20 Before proceeding, it is useful to note that for all speci…cations and cross-sections across Tables 2,   3 , and 4, the columns …rst report the treatment e¤ect estimated under exogeneity followed by the bias computed from (9) . Next, the implied ratio, obtained from dividing the estimated treatment e¤ect by the bias term, is displayed. Since results from the use of both …xed e¤ects and BVOLS are reported, it is also important to note that while both approaches lead to similar coe¢ cient estimates, coverage rates from the …rst Monte Carlo analysis in Baier and Bergstrand (2009b) …nd the …xed e¤ects approach to be slightly more reliable. Now, the …xed e¤ects estimates in Table 2 …nd RTA members to be associated with signi…cantly greater amounts of bilateral trade from 1970 onwards. 21 In fact, the positive and signi…cant estimates, also in most euro studies as a possible explanation, the suspicion is driven by gravity equations which do not control for the MR terms. 2 1 The (…xed e¤ects) coe¢ cient estimates of the other regressors are similar to those found in the literature, but are not the focus of the paper. As a result, they do not …nd mention, but are available upon request.
Results

Log Results
suggesting that any RTA e¤ect, observed for years more recent than 1950, is not causal but essentially a re ‡ection of positive selection.
Turning to CUs, Frankel (2008, p. 6) opines that "endogeneity ... is perhaps the most intractable problem with ... Rose-style estimates." However, Glick and Rose (2002) consider endogeneity to be a non-issue as far as currency unions are considered. In this light, it is interesting to examine the CU results.
From Table 3 Since RTA members and countries using a common currency are on average engaged in higher levels of trade, but only the CU e¤ect is robust to selection on unobservables, Table 4 presents an interesting scenario. Now, the treatment is de…ned as sharing both a currency union and belonging to a RTA. as "inadequate." Hence, in light of such concerns and given the potential selection issue, a (cross-section) 2 2 Before proceeding, note that some gravity studies include both RTA and CU as regressors in the same equation. However, the estimated RTA (CU) e¤ects were hardly found to change upon the inclusion of CU (RTA) as a regressor. In fact, this was true regardless of the BVOLS or …xed e¤ects approach. For the …xed e¤ects approach, the (cross-section) correlations between CU and RTA, after conditioning on all regressors, were found to be less than 0.085 in the majority of cases, and reached a maximum of 0.131 in 1970. 2 3 Incidentally, countries which adopted the euro are also RTA members. 2 4 Although the dataset contains a large (about …fty percent) number of zero trade observations, an additional check was performed before estimating the probit model. The log model was estimated after dropping observations for a country prior to its independence if all pairwise observations containing that country had zero trade, prior to its independence. The results remained very similar.
bivariate probit analysis for the three treatment variables is performed. The results …nd mention in Tables   5, 6 , and 7. 25 Across all three tables, the MR terms are controlled for using the BVOLS approach, which is employed with and without the BV constraints in the outcome equation. To proceed, the estimation is …rst performed without constraining . In this case, the values of and are identi…ed from the non-linearity arising from the assumption of bivariate normality. Next, the coe¢ cient estimates of the treatment variables are obtained after constraining the degree of selection from zero to positive amounts.
If the estimated e¤ect of the treatment is positive and statistically signi…cant when is constrained to zero, but quickly becomes statistically insigni…cant as deviates from zero, then this is evidence of a non-robust causal e¤ect. Moreover, the unconstrained gives some indication of the likely value of in reality. Table 5 …nds the RTA coe¢ cient estimates, obtained under exogeneity (i.e., = 0), to be positive and statistically signi…cant for all years except 1960. 26 In other words, RTA members are associated with a higher probability of forming a new trading relationship. In fact, the 1950 estimates are also robust to the varying amounts of positive selection considered. Even if there is positive selection to the tune of = 0:5, the treatment e¤ect under exogeneity cannot be explained away. Moreover, although the estimates of in the unconstrained model suggest that a value around 0.5 is not unlikely, the coe¢ cient estimates appear largely insensitive to increasing amounts of positive selection. As a result, regardless of the BV constraints, there is some evidence suggesting that the RTA e¤ect on the extensive margin for 1950 is causal with the marginal e¤ects (unreported) varying between 0.77 and 0.47. 27 However, given the relatively few country pairs belonging to RTAs in 1950, the estimates should be treated cautiously.
Next, for 1970, the evidence in favor of a robust causal e¤ect is ambiguous. To be more precise, when = 0, the estimates obtained after imposing the BV constraints …nd RTA members to be signi…cantly more likely to establish a new trading relationship. However, if is increased to even 0.2, the magnitude of selection is su¢ cient to reduce the marginal e¤ect from 0.19 to 0.08. In fact, if increases to 0.3, the coef…cient estimates are rendered insigni…cant. Since the RTA estimate changes from positive and signi…cant to insigni…cant when increases from 0.2 to 0.3, and given that the estimated lies between these values, 2 5 A relevant concern in the context of extensive margin is the issue of birth of nations (e.g., due to decolonization). However, Liu (2009) does not consider the pattern of extensive margin in this dataset to be driven by the emergence of new countries.
Moreover, Felbermayr and Kohler (2009) consider the issue to be less signi…cant with cross-section data. 2 6 The author reports non-robust standard errors to be more conservative (i.e., the author does not want to …nd the statistically signi…cant e¤ect obtained under exogeneity to disappear quickly due to large standard errors). Nonetheless, the results are virtually unchanged if one uses robust standard errors. Moreover, the post-1980 results further highlight the importance of the sensitivity analysis undertaken.
Although, the corresponding RTA coe¢ cients, under exogeneity, are positive and signi…cant across the log and probit models, the evidence in favor of a causal e¤ect is only witnessed at the extensive margin.
Turning to the CU results in Table 6 , perhaps the most striking aspect is the fact that even when the euro countries are considered as part of the treatment group, CU members (during 2000) are associated with a signi…cantly greater probability of establishing a new trading relationship. However, a closer look at the estimates obtained after imposing the BV constraints dispel any thoughts of a robust causal e¤ect.
To be more clear, the positive and signi…cant CU e¤ect obtained under exogeneity turns insigni…cant at the 90% con…dence level if the amount of positive selection is extremely modest with = 0:1. Since the unconstrained estimate of , obtained solely from the parametric assumptions of the model, exceeds 0.4, the evidence against a robust CU e¤ect is strong. 30 2 8 While the unconstrained estimates of are sensitive to the imposition of BV constraints, given Baier and Bergstrand's (2009b) theory, the estimates obtained after imposing the BV constraints are considered more reliable. For country pairs which form trade agreements in addition to adopting a common currency, the results in Table 7 …nd some evidence of a robust e¤ect on trade promotion only for 1990 and 2000 if none of the common currencies happen to be euro. While the value of is required to be 0.4 to explain the positive and signi…cant association during 1990, a more modest amount of selection is necessary to classify the estimates pertaining to 2000 as a selection e¤ect. However, such positive values of seem highly unlikely given the negative unconstrained estimates.
To summarize, the log results pertaining to overall trade …nd concerns over selection to be relevant only in the context of trade agreements. In other words, the evidence in favor of RTAs causing overall Bergstrand (2009b) , the estimates obtained after imposing the constraints are relied upon.trade is extremely weak. Moreover, since the evidence in favor of a robust causal e¤ect is strong for CUs, one is inclined to agree with Rose's (2001, p. 456) conjecture that "non-random selection" into common currency regimes is of "academic interest, but unimportant in practice." However, the probit results o¤er an interesting contrast. Evidence from recent years, …nd both RTAs and CUs to have some sort of a causal e¤ect at the extensive margin. Strikingly, the magnitude of either e¤ect is sensitive to positive selection.
Conclusion
RTAs and CUs share the characteristics of being trade cost proxies whose coe¢ cient estimates are not only of considerable interest, but are also conceived to be susceptible to selection bias. In both cases, this problem is magni…ed by the paucity of reliable instruments. As a result, studies estimating the e¤ects of RTAs, the policy combination should be modeled as a separate regime. Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cov(ε,ν)/Var(ν) refers to the asymptotic bias of the unconstrained estimate under the assumption of equal (normalized) selection on observables and unobservables. τ refers to the unconstrained estimate of the effect of membership into both CUs and RTAs. The implied ratio is the latter divided by the former.
See text for details. The number of observations for the BVOLS are smaller due to missing GDP values. Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. See text for details. For convergence, curcolony and curcolonizer had to be dropped 1990 onwards, only for the unconstrained BV models. For 2000, bothin had to be dropped as well. Convergence was extremely hard to achieve for 1980 with the BV constraints but otherwise curcolony, curcolonizer, and samelang had to be dropped. For 1960 and 1970, usually curcolony and curcolonizer had to be dropped. 1960 required additional variables to be dropped. For each cross section, within each specification, the set of variables is the same.
